The Optimum Level of Reserves in an

Exchange Rate Target Zone by Hurley, Margaret J. et al.
The Optimum Level of Reserves in an 
Exchange Rate Target Zone* 
M A R G A R E T H U R L E Y 
P A T M c C O R M A C K 
S T U A R T O ' B R I E N 
Maynooth College 
Abstract: The target zone exchange rate literature, initiated by Krugman (1991), has relevance 
for the question of what is the optimal level of reserves. In particular, Krugman and Rotemberg 
(1990) show that there is a well defined boundary between a target zone that is subject to specu­
lative attack and one which is sustainable. This boundary is defined by whether reserves are 
sufficient or not. This paper reviews briefly both the target zone and speculative attack 
literature. The appropriate level of reserves for Ireland is then calculated and discussed. 
I I N T R O D U C T I O N 
W hy does a country need foreign exchange reserves? One answer to this question focuses on the fact that if monetary authorities want to 
defend a particular exchange rate stance, a stock of reserves is required. The 
quantity of reserves that is required to defend an exchange rate policy will 
depend on a number of factors, most importantly the magnitude and type of 
shocks that impact on the exchange rate. I f the holding of foreign exchange 
reserves is costly, then the derivation of the optimal level of reserves becomes 
important; this will be the level just sufficient for effective exchange rate 
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defence. I f the level of reserves is small, then investors know that government 
attempts to defend an exchange rate policy are doomed to failure; the policy 
lacks credibility, and a speculative run on the currency will be triggered by 
any attempt to defend the policy. 
I n this paper we examine this recurring question of the optimal level of 
reserves, in particular looking at the quantity of reserves that is required i f 
the exchange rate is to be maintained within a band such as the E M S . We 
make use of some results from recent work on exchange rate regimes, in 
particular taking from Krugman and Rotemberg (1991) a derivation of the 
boundary between an exchange rate target zone that is subject to speculative 
attack, and one which can credibly be defended. The difference between the 
two exchange rate regimes is the level of reserves; using Ir i sh data, we 
calculate the stock of reserves required to make the defence of a target zone 
feasible. 
We start the paper by outlining the theory of the behaviour of exchange 
rates that are maintained within boundaries by Government intervention. 
This, relatively new, theory has been developed by Krugman (1991) and Froot 
and Obstfeld (1991). We also look at the theory of exchange rate regimes that 
are subject to speculative attack. The linkage between target zone exchange 
rate theory and speculative attack theory has been studied by Flood and 
Garber (1991), and leads to the definition of required foreign exchange 
reserves derived by Krugman and Rotemberg (1990,1991). 
The magic number for reserves is a proportion of domestic credit; this 
proportion depends on the semi-elasticity of money demand and the time 
series pattern of velocity shocks which are assumed to be the only shocks to 
impinge on the exchange rate. We estimate the required parameters, and 
thus estimate required foreign exchange reserves. We plot and discuss 
required reserves and compare it to an often used import cover measure of 
adequate reserves. We conclude by pointing out the shortcomings and 
strengths of the approach as a method of calculating optimal reserves. 
I I T A R G E T Z O N E S , S P E C U L A T I V E A T T A C K S AND L I M I T E D R E S E R V E S 
We start our review of the target zone literature by looking at exchange 
rates in a very simple flex-price monetary model. This model, which assumes 
purchasing power parity, a continuous time version of uncovered interest rate 
parity and stable, comparable money demand functions, gives the exchange 
rate as being determined by fundamentals and the expected changes in 
exchange rates, i.e.: 
x(t) = f(t) + ocE[dx(t)l(|>(t)] (1) 
where 
x is the exchange rate 
f is fundamentals 
a is the semi-elasticity of money demand 
<|> is the relevant information set on which expectations are based. 
The fundamental is assumed to consist of two parts; a component under 
the control of the government, m(t), and exogenous shocks to relative velocity, 
v(t). Shocks are assumed to hit the system via a stochastic process, that of 
Brownian motion with drift: 
where z is a Wiener process. 
In the free float case, governments never intervene, and therefore velocity 
shocks are the only variable affecting fundamentals. The relevant infor­
mation set, if investors find the no intervention rule credible, is simply the 
current level of the fundamental. I n this simple case, the solution to the 
above system is: 
A target zone is defined as an exchange rate corridor in which the 
exchange rate is allowed to float. The government intervenes to stop the 
exchange rate moving outside this pre-announced corridor. The basic target 
zone model is derived (following Krugman, 1991 and Svensson, 1991) under 
the assumptions that governments only intervene when the edges of the band 
are hit, that they then intervene by an infinitesimally small amount, and that 
they are never hindered from intervening by inadequate reserves. The model 
has the same set of equations as those above; here, however, the information 
set includes the fact that the government will intervene at the edges of the 
band. The exchange rate solution to the model is the now familiar S-shape 
derived by Krugman; the expectation of a prospective government interven­
tion is sufficient to bend the exchange rate/fundamental relationship below 
the free float solution "close" to the upper edge of the target zone and to bend 
the relationship above the free float solution in the lower half of the band. 
The exchange rate equation has two components; the linear part which is the 
free float solution, and extra terms which capture the non-linearities. I t is 
given by: 
dv(t) = udt + adz (2) 
x(t) = a n + fit). (3) 
x = G(f) = f + au + A x exp{A,jf} + A 2 exp{X 2f} (4) 
where A4 and X2 are the roots of the equation 
(aA, 2a 2)/2 + a p l - 1 = 0 (5) 
and A i and A 2 are constants which are determined by the "smooth pasting" 
conditions — the requirement that the exchange rate equation be tangent to 
the band edges, i.e. G'(f) = 0, G'(f) = 0. 
The above analysis assumes that the Government's announced policy of 
defending the target zone is fully credible. One reason why such a policy may 
be incompletely credible is that the authorities may not have sufficient 
reserves to defend a particular exchange rate policy. The exchange rate/ 
fundamentals relationship will therefore be different if the market partici­
pants' information set includes a finite stock of reserves. Krugman and 
Rotemberg (1990) have studied such a scenario. Their main result is that the 
announcement of a target zone will still have a volatility reducing effect on 
exchange rates even if reserves are insufficient; the exchange rate path will 
lie somewhere between the free-float solution and the fully credible target 
zone path. However, once the authorities are called upon to defend their 
exchange rate stance, a speculative attack occurs which depletes reserves and 
the exchange rate free floats. 1 
Speculation is defined as any private acquisition of reserves in anticipation 
of a possible exchange rate regime collapse. A speculative attack on a 
government's reserves can be viewed as a process by which investors change 
the composition of their portfolios, reducing the proportion of domestic 
currency and raising the proportion of foreign currency. This change in 
composition is then justified by a change in relative yields. 
Most of the speculative attack literature looks at fixed exchange rate 
regimes, where government attempts to maintain the exchange rate peg leads 
to a depletion of reserves and thus to a balance of payments crisis. Krugman 
(1979) describes a standard crisis in the following manner. A country pegs its 
exchange rate solely through direct intervention in the foreign exchange 
market. At the pegged rate the monetary authorities' reserves gradually 
decline, because of the balance of payments position. At some point, usually 
well before reserves would have been exhausted by the gradual depletion, 
there is a sudden speculative attack that rapidly eliminates the last of the 
reserves. The exchange rate peg can thereafter no longer be defended. 
1. Another branch of the target zone literature (Bertola and Carballero (1992) and Miller and 
Weller (1989) looks at the situation when the stochastic process switch is from target zone to new 
target zone; i.e. a realignment of the exchange rate peg rather than an abandonment of the peg. 
For such a new target zone to be credible, foreign exchange reserves are required; the 
realignment wi l l have to occur before the speculative attack depletes reserves. 
However, there may be some source of secondary reserves (gold, or credit 
lines) which the authorities may be able to use to temporarily stave off the 
speculative attack. Krugman shows in this case, even if the Government's 
policy is uncertain, there may be a whole sequence of temporary speculative 
attacks and recoveries of confidence before the attempt to maintain the 
exchange rate is finally abandoned. Buiter (1987) shows that borrowing to 
defend the exchange rate regime is usually counter-productive; borrowing 
both increases the likelihood of eventual collapse, and increases the magni­
tude of the speculative attack. However, if the time won by borrowing is used 
to initiate a policy of fiscal correction that makes the exchange rate viable, 
then borrowing will have positive impact. 
Flood and Garber (1984) determine the collapse time of a fixed exchange 
rate regime, by calculating a "shadow" floating exchange rate. This rate is the 
present discounted value of future expected fundamentals and s(t) would be 
the shadow rate at time t if it floated freely for all future time with reserves 
at their critical zero level. At the moment of an anticipated attack on foreign 
exchange reserves s(t) equals the fixed rate; this condition is used to time a 
collapse. An increase in initial reserves delays a collapse and an increase in 
the rate of domestic credit growth hastens the collapse. Blackburn (1988) 
questions a monetary authority's control of capital mobility and he feels that 
control measures may actually hasten a regime collapse i f prices are suf­
ficiently sluggish. There are many factors which make the timing of a specu­
lative attack extremely complicated, including market speeds of adjustment, 
stock-flow interactions and future exchange rate policy. 
There are two main results in the speculative attack literature that are 
relevant to our current problem. First , in a fixed exchange rate regime, 
speculative activity provides a one-way option. Except for transactions costs 
investors do not lose by speculating against the currency even if predictions of 
abandonment of fixed rates prove unjustified. I n that case the portfolio can 
simply be readjusted back to its original allocation at the same exchange rate. 
This is not precisely true in a target zone. Exchange rates have freedom of 
movement within the zone, and portfolio readjustments after an unsuccessful 
speculative attack may not be at the same exchange rate. The incentive to 
speculate decreases with the width of the band. The second result is an 
arbitrage condition. I n equilibrium, there can be no foreseeable jumps in 
exchange rates; the pre-attack and post-attack exchange rate must be the 
same. This condition is used as a definition of equilibrium in this literature. 
The scenario is as follows; the Government announces a target zone (x, x), 
and is prepared to use all its foreign reserves in unsterilised intervention i f 
the exchange rate threatens to breach the upper limit. We assume that 
Government behaviour is certain, and we rule out the recourse to secondary 
reserves discussed above. I f reserves are small, this leads to a speculative 
attack at the moment a velocity shock takes the exchange rate to the upper 
barrier, after which the exchange rate will free float. Investors know that the 
Government will continue to intervene until reserves run out; this fuels the 
speculative attack, and reserves will suddenly be exhausted at the moment 
the exchange rate hits the upper boundary. The exchange rate equation post 
attack is a free float straight line as derived above; pre-attack the relation­
ship is the non-linear path: 
G(f) = f + ecu + A i exp (X.if) + A 2 e x p (X^f) (6) 
Again, A i and A 2 need to be tied down by the economics of the situation. 
Insufficient reserves do not affect the lower boundary; here defending the 
target zone means adding to rather than depleting reserves. For simplicity, 
we set the lower boundary to minus infinity, giving a one-sided target zone 
with only one constant to be determined. This constant is not determined by 
smooth pasting, but by the more familiar arbitrage condition that there are 
no foreseeable jumps in exchange rates. 
The initial money supply is defined by: 
m = ln(D + R) (7) 
where D is domestic credit and R foreign exchange reserves. Following the 
speculative attack, the money supply will fall to: 
m* - ln(D). (8) 
The change in the money supply at the moment of the speculative attack is 
given by: 
m' - m = - ln ( l + R/D). (9) 
The exchange rate post-attack is given by the free float equation: 
x = m* + v + a|x. (10) 
At moment of the speculative attack, when a shock to velocity occurs that 
pushes the exchange rate to its upper limit, the exchange rate equation is 
given by: 
x = m + v + au + A exp X. xf. (11) 
The moment after the attack, when the exchange rate is free-floating the 
relationship is: 
The exchange rate is the same directly before and directly after the specu­
lative attack and one can solve for A. The relationship between the exchange 
rate and fundamentals is non-linear and depends on the reserves/deposits 
ratio. A is negative and therefore the path bends away from the free-float 
line. 
However, the above is not the complete story. As reserves get larger, A 
becomes increasingly negative, and the curved path becomes flatter. A curved 
path must turn downward at some point; for sufficiently large reserves the 
above equation gives an exchange rate path that has its maximum below x. 
This would indicate no possibility of government intervention or a speculative 
attack; since the above equation was derived on the logic of a possible attack, 
the above equation is not valid in these cases. 
This implies that the analysis above is only valid for small reserves. For 
large reserves the exchange rate path is derived as in a fully credible target 
zone. Reserves are defined to be large if they lead to an exchange rate path 
that has a maximum on or below x. There will be a unique amount of 
reserves that is just large enough; this is the level that gives an exchange rate 
path with a maximum at x, that is, the exchange rate path that "smooth 
pastes" the upper boundary. This gives an intuitive rationale for the smooth 
pasting boundary condition used to derive the original target zone 
relationship. 
The critical level of reserves can be derived as follows: with smooth pasting 
at x = x, (and A 2 = 0) taking the first derivative of the general exchange rate 
fundamentals relationship (6) and setting it to zero gives: 
x = m* + v + ecu. (12) 
AexpA^f = - — • 
1 
(13) 
Substituting this above in (11) gives 
_ 1 
x = m + v + au 
x1 
(14) 
and therefore by comparing (11) and (12) we have 
1 f\ R ) 1 m - m = - In 1 H — = 
, d J V 
(15) 
The critical level of reserves is given by: 
R = D [exp(lAi) - 1]- (16) 
For reserves smaller than this level, the exchange rate target zone will be 
subject to speculative attack; for large reserves, the target zone wil l be 
defendable. 
I l l R E Q U I R E D R E S E R V E S I N I R E L A N D 
To calculate the threshold level of reserves for a particular economy a 
number of parameters are required. The first parameter is the semi-elasticity 
of money demand (a); also required are parameters determining the drift ((i.) 
and variability around drift (a) of the shocks to velocity. We first looked at the 
order of magnitudes of these parameters used in the target zone literature. 
Smith and Smith (1990) require the same set of parameters for their study of 
the return to the gold standard in Britain; they assign the semi-elasticity the 
value {0.5, 6.5, 13} the drift term the values (0.0001 0.01} and the magnitude 
of variation term {.0032, .32}. Svensson (1991) draws a series of target zone 
diagrams with \i = 0, a = .1 and a = 1, 3, and 5. Bertola and Carballero 
calibrate their model of realignments with the parameters (i = 0.5, a = 1 and 
a = 0.5. This gives an idea of the appropriate order of magnitude for the 
required parameters. 
The semi-elasticity of money demand was extracted from a simple Cagan 
style estimated money demand function over the years 1979-1992. The 
monetary aggregate used was M3, the scale variable used was retail sales and 
the interest rate used was the exchequer bill rate . 2 The estimated semi-
elasticity was 2.48. 
To find appropriate values for the shocks that impact on the exchange rate 
we simply looked at the time series pattern of M3 velocity. We regressed the 
change in velocity on a constant trend and took |X to be the estimated constant 
coefficient the trend, and a to be the standard error of the residuals from the 
regression. We found: 
11 = .0022 
a = .187 
a = 2.48. 
These parameter values give a required reserves/domestic credit ratio of 
23.48 per cent. Optimal reserves calculated by this method are graphed in 
Figure 1. 
2. See Hurley and Guiomard (1989) for a discussion of the appropriate variables for an Irish 
money demand study. 
We also briefly looked at the sensitivity of our required reserves ratio, by 
plugging in a number of other parameters in our calculations. This is shown 
in Table 1. Most of the sets of parameters give ratios in the region of 15 per 
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Figure 1: Actual and Optimal Reserves: Levels 
Figure 1 plots the actual and optimal level of reserves. On average, 
reserves appear to be approximately optimal during the early years of our 
sample (1989-1992), above optimal in the mid-eighties, dipping below optimal 
during 1989/1990 and showing up as dramatically suboptimal in the final 
months of the sample. However, it is worth emphasising that having reserves 
that are optimal on average is not sufficient; any point where the reserves are 
below our optimal level could lead to the triggering of a speculative attack. It 
is also interesting to point out that around the time of the 1986 devaluation 
reserves were above our measured optimal level. Below optimal reserves in 
1989/1990 are due to outflows of capital; the reason for these outflows is 
unknown. Actual reserves fell below our optimal level in mid 1992 (Figure 2) 
and were well below optimal when Britain pulled out of the E R M . 
Table 1 
mu sigma alpha lamda ratio 
0 .1 1 14.14214 .0732707 
0 .2 1 7.071068 .1519099 
.1 .1 1 7.320508 .1463724 
.1 .2 1 5 .2214028 
0 .1 2 10 .1051709 
0 .2 2 5 .2214028 
.1 .1 2 4.142136 .2730573 
.1 .2 2 3.090170 .3821038 
0 .1 3 8.164966 .1302903 
0 .2 3 4.082483 .2775561 
.1 .1 3 2.909944 .4100838 
.1 .2 3 2.287136 .5484093 
.0011 .11 1.69 9.799114 .1074389 
.0022 .187 2.4783 4.741427 .2347975 
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Figure 2: Actual and Optimal Reserves: Differences 
A rule of thumb estimate of adequate reserves (of unknown origin) is 2.5 
months import cover. Figure 3 plots this level of import cover against actual 
reserves. This measure of calculating optimal reserves gives similar results to 
our measure in the early years of the sample; in later years the import cover 
measure underestimates required reserves. I n particular, our measure of 
optimal reserves shows reserves to be dangerously low relatively early in 
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Figure 3: Reserves and Import Cover 
I V C O N C L U S I O N S 
We have derived a simple measure of optimal reserves, based on the need 
to have sufficient reserves for credible defence of an exchange rate target 
zone. For Ir i sh data, reserves were approximately optimal for most of the 
1980s but significantly below optimal during 1989 and again during 1992 
from June onwards. Our results suggest that foreign exchange reserves 
should be kept above about 25 per cent of domestic credit. 
Our measure of reserves has some shortcomings. It shares with much of 
the optimal reserves literature the neglect of lines of credit as a means of 
exchange rate regime defence. I n theory, if credit lines are sufficiently large 
(and credible), a target zone could be defended without reserves. The rules of 
the E M S are such that members can call on unlimited financing for the 
purposes of marginal interventions. However, as Gros and Thygesen (1992) 
have documented, this type of financing has been small to non-existent in 
recent years. Moreover, the continued perception of reserves as an important 
economic indicator suggests that the lines of credit are insufficient for 
exchange rate policy credibility. 
Secondly, our model looks only at the need for reserves for the defence of 
the exchange rate at the margin; in reality, most of E M S intervention takes 
place intermarginally. I t appears, however, that our estimate should still 
form a lower bound for the stock of reserves required for target zone defence. 
I f the monetary authorities choose to intervene intermarginally, thereby 
using up reserves, then reserves need to be higher; sufficient both for the 
intermarginal intervention and to cover the possibility of exchange rate 
defence at the margin. Krugman and Rotemberg's derivation is independent 
of the current position of the exchange rate in the band. 
Finally, our modelling of shocks to the system is highly simplified. I n par­
ticular, we look only at shocks to domestic money demand and ignore external 
shocks that impact on the exchange rate. The stochastic process governing 
fundamentals is assumed to be Brownian motion with drift; in more complex 
target zone models this process mean reverts. 
The strength of approach lies first in the simplicity and neatness of its con­
clusion; reserves should be maintained above a constant fraction of domestic 
credit. Second, the approach is firmly based on the defence of a particular 
exchange rate regime; reserves are required for exchange rate defence and 
the minimum quantity of reserves required depends on the exchange rate 
regime being defended. 
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